A city founded by a Saint

Perhaps not all of the good people of Puerto Princesa City are appreciative, or even aware, that a true and most honorable distinction of the town is that of having been founded by a Saint: One of the signatories to the acta or deed/document of March 4, 1872, establishing the pueblo, was the chaplain of the expedition sent for that purpose, Fray Ezequiel Moreno, O.A.R. (Read more...)

From:

https://palawan-news.com/norms/

Norms

This year, 2018, is my eighth in the business of (supposed) lawmaking; and working with or among legislators brings one to occasional philosophizing on “law”. Of course, by “philosophy”, we mean “the knowledge of things according to their ultimate causes”. I like to translate this last phrase as pagmumuni-muni sa puno at dulo ng mga bagay-bagay, which I think I owe to Father Roque J. Ferriols, S.J., my favorite philosophy professor in college (he will be celebrating his 94th birthday this coming August 16, and I include his well-being in my prayers). Thinking of Fr. Ferriols also reminds me that July 31 is the feastday of St. Ignatius of Loyola, Founder of the Society of Jesus. Ad maiorem Dei gloriam!

Going back to “law”, I am intrigued by the word “norm” as a substitute, along with “rule” or “ordinance”. “Norm” is not often used as a noun, but in its familiar adjectival form, “normal”, we recognize the reference to a “standard” or rule of behavior.

Nowadays, when I hear or see the word in the context of law, what immediately comes to mind is the phrase, “peremptory norm of international law”, the concept of jus cogens (Latin for “compelling law”). And, surely, it is not difficult to appreciate its definition in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969): “a peremptory norm of general international law is…a norm from which no derogation is permitted” (Art. 53; italics mine). Of course, legal theory also acknowledges the existence of “hortatory norms” which, in contrast with peremptory norms, merely “exhort”.

At the risk of oversimplifying (which I trust my co-workers in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and friends in the legal profession will forgive), I think much of local legislation would have to do with the operations of the local government rather than the conduct of private citizens (which latter are already covered by numerous national laws). Thus, the most important pieces of local legislation are the annual budget ordinance (and its modifications, if any, in the course of the fiscal year); and the authorization of non-routinary, specific acts or transactions of the local government, e.g., borrowing money, creating a new office or position, purchasing land, etc. These are also norms in the sense that they allow or permit acts thatwould not otherwise be allowed or permitted, and establish the conditions for their exercise or performance.

In the also rule-bound process of passing these ordinances (or “resolutions”, in the case of measures creating hortatory norms), there is assurance that the people’s elected representatives have deliberated on the wisdom of the action and its foreseeable consequences, to serve the best interest of the public. Salus populi est suprema lex (Cicero).

Still, a more precise formulation of the ultimate causes of “law” is that of St. Thomas Aquinas: Law (human, civil law; as distinguished from Divine law, etc.) is “an ordinance of reason for the common good promulgated by the political authority”.  The definition breaks down neatly into the Four “ultimate causes” of being-as-being (ens qua ens; being-in-existence) identified by classical philosophy.

Regarding “law”: 1) The Matter or “material cause” (what gives a thing the potency or capacity to become what it is) is the ordinance or rule itself; 2) The Form or “formal cause” (what gives a thing the “act” of being what it is) is the reasonableness (of the ordinance); 3) The “Efficient Cause” (what directly gives rise to the existence of the thing) is the promulgation done by the political authority; and 4) The End or “final cause” (the ultimate purpose for which it exists) is the “common good”.

Indeed, laws have to be reasonable. Ordinances that are not reasonable do not qualify, strictly speaking, as “law”. In the extreme, citizens have no moral obligation to obey unreasonable rules and may even have the duty to resist and work to abolish them. Indeed, unreasonable laws may be declared void by the courts for contravening the constitutional guarantee of “due process”: “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law” (Sec. 1, Art. III, 1987 Constitution). “Due process” is understood to have a “substantive”, not just “procedural”, aspect. This substantive aspect is precisely “reasonableness” (as opposed to the quality of being unjust, oppressive, whimsical, arbitrary, etc.).

Furthermore, laws can only emanate from the “political authority”—the competent and “duly constituted authorities”—and should have been promulgated or made known in a manner whereby the ordinary citizen affected could reasonably be expected to know of it, such as to justify the precept, “ignorance of the law excuses no one.”

Most important, of course, law must serve the “common good”, which is “the sum of those conditions of social life which allow social groups and their individual members relatively thorough and ready access to their own fulfillment” (Gaudium et Spes, No. 26). As far as I know, this is the most accurate and comprehensive (and authoritative) definition of the common good; and it happens to come to us from the social doctrine of the Catholic Church. (30.VII.2018)